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Abstract 
 
Since 1987, the EU allows dairy quota transfers within member states, but the trading rules 
differ across member states and in time. In the Flanders case, before 1996, quota transactions 
happened in a free market with high quota prices, from 1996 to 2004 they have been centrally 
organised with a fixed lower price. Various studies have quantified quota transfer 
inefficiencies by comparing the observed quota allocation and the allocation that should 
appear under a perfect quota market. This study uses a Markov chain model to quantify 
observed quota transactions and the resulting structural development of the Flemish dairy 
sector. The results show that structural development is higher during the free market period 
and that this has also an influence on the aggregate sector performance with respect to total 
production cost, nitrate emission and milk quality. With the free quota market policy, 
structural development would lead in 2014 to a decline of the total production costs of 3.04%, 
a reduction of milk quality penalty points of 20% and a decrease in the N- excretion of 2.95%. 
With a restricted quota mobility, structural development resulted only in improvements of 
2.58% (-15.1%), 14.26% (-28.7%) and 2.20 % (-25.4%) respectively. 
1 Introduction 
Since the introduction of the common agricultural policy, the European agricultural sector has 
faced an important structural change. This is in particular the case for dairy farming. In 
Flanders, the northern part of Belgium, for example, the number of farms has dropped from 
27,663 in 1984 to 8,862 in 2005. In this period the European policy has changed several 
times. The introduction of dairy quota in 1984 was the most important policy change in recent 
history. At that time, the system of guaranteed prices had created large government stocks of 
butter and powdered milk, consuming a significant part of the EU budget. This European 
policy of limiting milk production is considered as one of the most notable applications of 
quotas (Alvarez et al. 2006). 
 
Since 1987, the EU allows quota transfers within member states, but trading rules differ 
across member states (Bailey 2002; Alvarez et al. 2006). In Flanders the quota transfer system 
can be divided in three periods. At the start in 1987/88, a rather liberal system of quota 
transfers has introduced. This system has undergone only minor changes until in 1996/97 the 
quota trade regulation has been reformed drastically. Before 1996 free quota mobility between 
farmers was allowed and merging was possible, however liable to a siphon. The siphon was 
subject to the farm quota size and changed over time. Because of some perverse effects of the 
liberal system in particular high quota prices, the basic idea of the major reform of 1996/97 
was to (1) safeguard the sector profitability, (2) work out an acceptable regulation for young 
farmers, ensuring reasonable quota prices, and (3) pursuit an efficient, adaptable and 
manageable system. Therefore free quota mobility between farmers has been forbidden in that 
year. Since then, transfers of quota were only possible through a centrally organised quota 
fund, or by means of taking over an existing farm or establishing a new farm. A third period 
started in 2004/2005 in which free mobility is again allowed albeit a bit more regulated than 
in the first period (Jespers et al. 2006). Because of this drastic change in the rules, the Flemish 
situation is an exemplary case to study the effect of quota trade regulations on the structural 
change in the dairy sector. 
 
The goal of this paper is to understand the role of quota exchange policy on structural change 
and its impact on some key characteristics of the Flemish dairy sector. Flanders is a region in 
Belgium (E.U.) with an intensive agriculture. In 2005 Flanders has 34,410 farms with a total 
agricultural production value of 4.471 billion €. The dairy sector is third most important sub 
sector with a production value of 552 million € (11.7%). In 2005, Flanders counts 8,862 dairy 
farms, holding 308,883 dairy cows, and dairy quota amounts 1.940 billion litres.  
 
The effect of structural change on other sector parameters is hardly examined (Huffman & 
Evenson 2001). Weersink and Tauer (1991) have found that structural change causes changes 
in productivity. Effects on other parameters have, according to the authors knowledge, so far 
not been analysed yet. In this research, the effects of structural change on productions costs, 
milk quality and nutrient emissions are measured. These three parameters are selected because 
of data availability and because of the importance to look also to non-economic parameters 
when evaluating quota transfer policies which are often inspired by other than economic 
reasons. Production costs can be seen as an economic parameter, nutrient emissions and milk 
quality are respectively an environmental and health or processing parameter.  
 
The structure of the article is as follows. First, we motivate a simplified approach to analyse 
structural change, given the specificity of quota regimes and data availability. Second, the use 
of Markov-analysis to define and analyse structural change is discussed in detail, followed by 
a description of the Markov chain model and data used in this study. Then three structure 
dependent variables are described. In the following section the structural change is calculated 
under two policy assumptions and simulations of the structural evolution path till 2014/15 are 
made (because the quota policy is likely to be abolished at the end of March 2015). The 
implications of the structural change on the sector performance are illustrated by means of 
describing the evolution of the three variables mentioned before. The final section contains a 
summary and some conclusions. 
2 Structural change and sector characteristics in relation 
to quota regimes 
 
Several studies have dealt with the issue of structural change in agriculture. A majority of 
them looked at the effect of several government policies concerning the whole agricultural 
sector, e.g. R&D and government payments to structural change in the U.S. (Huffman & 
Evenson 2001; Yee & Ahearn 2005). Also Tweeten (1984) discusses structural change of the 
US farm sector and relates it to his micro-economic foundations: he concludes that 
technology, national economic growth and off-farm income are driving forces and must be 
taken into account when describing structural change. Goddard et al. (1993) adds changes in 
human capital, demographics, off-farm employment, related market structure, and public 
programs as other important determinants. According to Weiss (1999) most of the theoretical 
literature stresses on managerial ability and life-cycle patterns as major reasons why 
firm/farm sizes changes over time. Although it is important to look to some general 
principles, knowing the effect of some sub sector specific policies is important as well.  
 
The importance of the impact of quota on the structural evolution of a sector is recognised by 
Bailey (2002) and Alvarez et al. (2006). Both studies use an estimated cost function to 
describe inefficiencies and changes in the quota market. Bailey (2002) focuses on differences 
between 6 European Union member states and Alvarez et al. (2006) on differences between 
milk producers within Spain. Once the cost functions and quota rent are estimated both Bailey 
(2002) and Alvarez et al. (2006) compare the actual situation with a situation of a perfect 
quota market. Bailey (2002) concludes that countries applying strict quota rules are likely to 
experience less structural change than those with more liberal quota trade arrangements.  
 
In contrast to Bailey (2002) and Alvarez et al. (2006), this paper presents an approach based 
on Markov analysis. The advantage of this methodological choice is that simulations do not 
rely on the assumption of a perfect quota market and that also the stopping behaviour of 
different types of farms is taken into account. Simulations reflect observed quota transaction 
patterns and structural change. In the Flemish case, this means that changes in policy regimes 
can be compared. Assuming continuation or change of these policies, projections can then be 
made of structural change and its impact on other parameters.  
 
On the other hand, the presented approach simplifies other models in literature of structural 
change. There are two reasons for not taking into account some important economic 
parameters, such as prices, costs and technological change. The first motivation is that the 
simplification is possible because the quota restriction limits the total size of the dairy sector. 
The logic of this simplification is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1: Illustration of shift in production as a consequence of changed marginal revenues and cost in 
case of quota or without quota.  
 
As long as the firm or sector, as illustrated in Figure 1, does not face any quota constraint, the 
quantity produced is a. This production will increase to a’ when the marginal cost decreases to 
the marginal cost’ and even further when the marginal revenue increases to the marginal 
revenue’. When the firm or sector is subject to a binding quota constraint, the production is 
not affected by changes of marginal revenues or marginal costs (dotted line in Figure 1). As 
long as the quota remains a binding constraint, the variation of economic parameters is 
absorbed in changes of quota rent, which becomes quota rent’. In a quota regime, as it is the 
case in Flanders, actual growth and stopping behaviour of farms is not directly influenced by 
prices and costs changes, but by their translation in quota rent. .  
 
While the aggregate level of prices and costs is not so important in the structural change of 
the dairy sector, Alvarez et al. (2006) argues that the variability between farms of these prices 
and costs for general efficiency reasons should play a role in the exchange of quota. A farm 
with a high margin on milk, and thus a high quota rent, should be able to acquire additional 
quota from a less profitable farm. A higher difference in profitability among dairy farms 
should therefore lead to more quota exchanges, which again reduces variability between 
farms. In Flanders, however, the differences between farm gate milk prices are relatively 
small because of the limited number of processors and the EU sustained milk powder and 
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butter prices. The costs variations between farms are more important because of differences in 
efficiency and scale of the farms. Alvarez et al. (2006) have shown that in Spain differences 
in efficiency and scale both contribute to differences in quota rent.  
 
From the great disparity in profitability among dairy farms, on the one hand, and only limited 
exchanges, on the other hand, Alvarez et al. (2006) conclude that the dairy quota market is not 
transparent and not functioning well due to complex policy restrictions of quota transfers. 
This is also empirically confirmed by Van Passel et al. (2006) for the Flemish case. With an 
econometrically estimated panel model, Van Passel et al. (2006) measure the impact of 
efficiency and size, as two components of cost differences, on the growth of Flemish dairy 
farms. They have found that efficiency is not a significant contributor to dairy farm growth, 
while farm size is highly significant. Due to quota trade restrictions, a higher efficiency alone 
apparently is not sufficient to acquire additional quota. The link between farm size and 
growth is probably significant because in Flanders the differences in costs are more related to 
size than to efficiency and quota transaction restrictions are often linked with size limits. 
Therefore, it is important to include besides farm size also quota transfer policies and actual 
transfer behaviour to make a simple but yet reliable model of structural change in the Flemish 
dairy sector.    
 
The disadvantage of such a simplified model of structural change is that it can not simulate 
the impact on quota rents, but the lower data demand can be seen as an advantage of the 
approach.  
 
The second motivation for using a simple model is that the data on prices, costs and 
technological change are often not accessible and, if available, are based on not representative 
samples. The proposed model works with data available at administrative level for the whole 
population to assess accurately the process of structural change. Based on the number of 
farms in each size category and the average characteristics for each size category calculated 
with a non-representative sample, a reliable analysis is possible of the impact of structural 
change on other parameters such as production costs, milk quality and nutrient emissions (N).  
3 Markov chain model and data 
3.1.Analysis of structural change with Markov analysis 
 
We perform our analyses in three steps. The first step is to measure structural change by 
changes in size distribution of farms. This is to characterize the probability of mobility of an 
individual farm from and to different states of size and to identify how the quota transfer 
policy affects this mobility path. Markov-models are used because they are known as a 
convenient tool for analyzing the systems evolutions (Mohapatra et al. 2007). Also Padberg 
(1962) suggests that a Markov process is appropriate to analyze the dynamics of the number 
of firms and to evaluate the changes in size distributions of firms within an industry. A list of 
examples of agriculture related Markov studies is given by Zepeda (1995a; Zepeda 1995b).   
 
Padberg (1962), Hallberg (1969) and MacMilla, Tung and Tulloch (1974) point out following 
shortcomings of a stationary Markov process: movement, entry, and exit are forced to be 
proportional to farm numbers while other economic factors are not allowed to influence 
farming structure. They recommend a non-stationary model incorporating economic factors as 
explanatory variables, but in the case of quota with positive rent the economic factors explain 
less as they are captured by changes in the quota rent. Therefore, we argue that in sectors with 
a quota system, stationary Markov processes indeed can be used. 
  
Before we can measure the structural change of the sector, the order of the Markov chain must 
be defined. While in first-order Markov chains the transition probabilities controlling the 
future state depends only on its current state, in higher-order Markov chains the current state 
alone is not sufficient to measure the future state (Cazacioc & Cipu 2005). Considering a 
second-order Markov chain, the transition probabilities depend on the states at lags of both 
one and two time periods (Cazacioc & Cipu 2005). 
We make use of the Akaike Criterion (AIC) to define the order of the Markov model. This 
criterion is based on the loglikelihood functions for the transition probabilities of the Markov 
chains constructed on a certain data series. These log-likelihoods depend on the transition 
counts and the estimated transition probabilities (Cazacioc & Cipu 2005). The log-likelihoods 
for Markov chains of order 0, 1, 2 and 3 are: 
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Here the summations are performed over all the states s of the Markov chain. The Statistics of 
AIC can be seen below: 
 
)1(22)( −+−= ssLmAIC mm       (2) 
 
The order m that minimizes equation (2) is chosen as appropriate. For the policy measures 
that will be analyzed in this paper, the chain seems to be of second order, which gives 
following notation for the transition probabilities: 
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For farms which are in state 1 in year t-2, the probability matrix of year t is given as: 
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The change in farm size distribution is the key parameter to structural development. While in 
literature often use is made of herd size to measure farm size (Zepeda 1995a; Bailey 2002; 
Colman et al. 2002; Kim et al. 2005), we prefer, however, the quota size as measure for farm 
size. Taken together with the herd size, this parameter also capture cow productivity. As cow 
productivity can vary among different farms and as returns depends on total milk production 
and not on the number of cows, we argue that quota size is a better indicator for the farm size 
than the number of cows.  
 
3.2. data and model choice 
 
The analysis uses data from the so-called ‘administrative’ data base, this is the data base from 
the administrative follow-up of the quota regulation. The data base is set up by the Flemish 
Department for Agriculture and Fishery (DAF, in Dutch ALV). The data set contains the 
quota size of each Flemish farm for every year along the period 1987-up to now (for the 
current paper, data up to 2005 are used). The quota size of each Flemish dairy farm is 
recorded at the end of each dairy quota year (31st of March). The farms were categorised into 
seven farm states with different quota sizes (Table 1). These categories allows to perform 
further research on the impact of structural development on other sector parameters.  
 
Table 1: The seven states of farm size, based on farm quota 
number Quota size (litres of milk) 
1 0 
2 0 – 100,000 
3 100,000 – 200,000 
4 200,000 – 300,000 
5 300,000 – 400,000 
6 400,000 – 500,000 
7 >500,000 
 
While some researches assume that farms typically do not decrease in size without going out 
of business (Disney et al. 1988), others assume that in a single period farms could change by 
only one size category (Zepeda 1995a). In the dataset all possible transition occurred and, 
therefore, the model also allows transitions between all different states. This means that farms 
can both increase of decrease in size from one to another year.  
Using time as a proxy for the policy regulation we divide the period into two sub periods. The 
first period, called ‘free mobility’, is the period where free mobility between farmers was 
allowed (1987/88-1995/96). The second period, called ‘restricted mobility’, is the period 
where free mobility was forbidden (with some exceptions) and where every quota transaction 
had to pass along the public Quota Fund (1996/97-2003/04). For both investigated policy 
regulations a transition matrix is calculated. The third period (from 2003/2004 on) with again 
free mobility is not considered because of not yet enough observations. 
 
Central to the application of the Markov chain model to data is the estimation of its transition 
probability matrix. Let Xt denote the quota size of the farm at time t. The state space of Xt is 
[0,1,…,6]. For each year we can count the number of times that Xt = i is preceded by Xt-1 = h 
and is followed by Xt+1 = j for h,i,j= 0,1,…6. This summed over all years per period gives us 
the transition records for ‘free mobility’ and ‘restricted mobility’. The estimates of the 
transition probability matrices are obtained by dividing each row element of transition records 
by its corresponding row total. The summing over all years assumes that the Markov chain is 
homogeneous in time.  
 
We use a Markov chain model, based on the Markov process proposed by Chavas and 
Magand in Zepeda (1995a). They characterize the process as a function of net new entries 
(new entries minus exits) and movement between size categories. The net new entries in 
Zepeda (1995a) are a function of economic parameters while in the model proposed in this 
paper the new entries are a function of not filled quota of existing farms while the exits are a 
function of the number of existing farms and transition probabilities and therefore 
incorporated in the probability matrix.  
 
)1(* −∑+= tjiijktktkt nPdn        (5) 
The number of first time entrants to state k between t-1 and t are defined by dkt. The 
movements between size categories (states) at time t equals the transition probability Pijkt 
times the number of farms making the transition from state i at time t-2 to state j at time t-1.  
To simplify the analysis, following assumptions are made: (1) the average quota size in each 
state is constant over time (based on actual figures of the period 1987-2005), and (2) the 
distribution of new entries over the different states is constant over time (based on actual 
figures of the period 2003-2005). 
 
The model is build up as follows: we start from two given basic years t and t+1, of which the 
true size distribution is know. A matrix is formulated with the number of transitions between 
both years. In the next step this matrix is multiplied by the corresponding probability matrix. 
For each state we measure the number of farms and calculate the total quota of farms in that 
state. The sum of quota of each state is subtracted of the national (Flemish) quota. The 
difference between national and pre-occupied amount is filled up with new entries according 
to the fixed distribution over the different states. The total active farms per state is the sum of 
the number of farms calculated by using the probability matrix and the new entries. This 
sequence of events is repeated each year. 
 
3.3. Production costs, milk quality and total N-excretion  
 
Based on the structural change in terms of farm size distribution, the second phase of the 
research simulates the effect of the structural change on three other sector parameters, such as 
the effect on the production costs of milk (€/litre), the average milk quality (in terms of 
penalty points) and the total N-excretion of the Flemish dairy sector. 
 
To measure the impact of structural development on the milk production costs, data of the 
accounting system of Boerenbond (Flemish farmers union) are used. The dataset contains 693 
dairy farms (7.81% of the total number of Flemish dairy farms) (Table 2) 
 
Table 2: Comparison of the number of farms and the average quota size per state between the 
Boerenbond-dataset and the ALV-dataset 
Boerenbond dataset ALV dataset  
Number 
of farms 
Farms 
(%) 
Average 
quota 
size 
Number 
of farms 
Farms 
(%) 
Average 
quota 
size 
Deviation 
average quota 
size (%) 
State 1 8 1.16 78,920 2,408 27.17 54,302 -31.1932 
State 2 73 10.53 155,570 2,568 28.98 142,315 -8.52022 
State 3 166 23.95 252,020 1,532 17.29 247,808 -1.6713 
State 4 169 24.39 346,254 1,094 12.34 343,856 -0.69247 
State 5 130 18.76 443,285 622 7.02 441,212 -0.46771 
State 6 147 21.21 639,717 638 7.20 627,250 -1.94878 
 
The Boerenbond-dataset contains relatively more large farms than the ALV-dataset. However 
the average quota size per state are relatively equal between both datasets, except for state 1 
and 2 (Table 2).  
 
The total production cost of milk per farm is derived from the accounting data (variable + 
fixed costs). To obtain the average production cost (€/litre) the total production cost is divided 
by the size of production. The milk price is relatively constant and mainly varies among farms 
according to the milk quality. Therefore, the total production cost gives us an indication about 
the farm profitability as well. 
 
A second variable in our research is the average milk quality. This parameter is important to 
the processing industry. A higher quality leads to lower processing costs. For the farms it is 
important as well, as the received milk price is derived of the milk quality. There are six 
parameters in the official quality determination: bacterial count, cell count, freezing point, 
sediment, disinfectants and inhibitors. The first five parameters are evaluated in a penalty 
point system. The dairy farm gets penalty points according to a specific scheme if the milk 
does not meet certain standards. A price deduction of 0.62 EUR per 100 litres is applied for 
each penalty point at the monthly payment of the milk delivered by this dairy farm. The 
bacterial count indicates the bacterial infections after milking. The cell count gives an 
indication of the udder health. A higher freezing point indicates if the milk is diluted with 
water. Sediments point at an insufficient purification of the udder and the udder environment. 
Disinfectants are necessary in keeping the milk installation bacteria free. Remnants however, 
show an insufficient rinsing of the installation. As the penalty points system of a farm 
contains five out of six quality parameters, it gives a good indication of the farm milk quality. 
The average milk quality is measured per state en is expressed as penalty-litre-points. This 
parameter is obtained by multiplying the penalty points with the delivered quantity of milk. It 
allows to take the number of penalty points into account as well as the quantity of milk 
delivered with that certain quality. Thus this parameter seems to give a better indication of the 
quality of the total Flemish milk quota than only counting the given penalty points. Penalty-
litre-points are larger either when a larger quantity is delivered or when a higher number of 
penalty points is given (two penalty points lead to double penalty-litre-points for the same 
delivered quantity as one penalty point). 
 
The third variable is N-excretion, which is an important variable, as the Flemish region faces 
an excess of manure (N). The N-excretion is subject to a strict legislation and the rights to 
produce manure (in terms of N) are divided among farms by means of transferable nutrient 
emission rights. A decline (increase) of the sector N-excretion can lead to an excess (shortage) 
of nutrient emission rights in the sector. This would mean an extra benefit (cost) for the 
sector. The N-excretion of a cow is proportional to the cow productivity. A higher milk 
production per cow leads to a higher N-excretion (equation 6): 
 
XY *008.050 +=      with Y = N-excretion (Kg N/cow)  (6) 
     And X = cow productivity (litre milk/cow) 
 
During the analysis averages values for each farm size category can be calculated for the 
variables production costs, milk quality and nitrogen excretion. These averages per category 
are multiplied by the number of farms per category that are obtained from the ALV dataset 
and simulations of the Markov Chain. Despite the fact that the sample of the Boerenbond 
dataset is not representative, the final aggregate result is representative because the ALV 
dataset covers the total population and is used to weight the parameters of the Boerenbond 
dataset.  
4 Results 
4.1.Effects of policy regulations on structural change in the Flemish dairy sector:  
 Since the introduction of quota transfers, the Flemish dairy sector experienced a major 
structural development. Table 3 illustrates the difference between the rate of change between 
the two most important policy alternative periods and indicates that structural development is 
higher during the free mobility period than during the restricted mobility period. 
 
Table 3: Average annual growth rate of the number of farms and the average quota size during the  free 
mobility and restricted mobility period 
 Number of farms Average quota size 
 Rate of change 
Farms/Year 
% 
change 
Rate of change 
litres/Year 
% change 
Free mobility -1,008 -6.22 8,099 +6.64 
Restricted mobility -331 -3.07 5,715 +3.17 
 
Table 4: The mean probability of non-mobility per size category and per policy period (free mobility and 
restricted mobility) (* significance of the independent t-test between period with free mobility and period 
with restricted mobility) 
Transition 
(*) 
Period of free mobility 
(1988/89-1995/96) 
Period of restricted mobility 
(1996/97-2003/04) 
Significance(*) 
2-2-2 0.882051197 0.908965695 0.065** 
3-3-3 0.899924503 0.946903187 0.049*** 
4-4-4 0.864300079 0.945965796 0.003*** 
5-5-5 0.843465046 0.947176368 0.001*** 
6-6-6 0.825652842 0.94909578 0.002*** 
7-7-7 0.934160305 0.987872106 0.009*** 
(*)First number indicates the original state or size category, the second and third numbers indicate the 
two successive years. As we report the farms remaining in the same state, the states are the same for the 
three periods 
 
 
Table 4 gives the mean probability of remaining in a state per policy measure and per state or 
size category. For every state the probability of non-mobility is higher in the period where 
mobility is restricted. It can therefore be concluded that the choice of policy has a significant 
influence on the transition probabilities and, as a result, on the rate of structural change. 
 
Based on the calculated probabilities for the two types of transfer policy, it is possible to 
perform simulations of the total number of farms, the size distribution of the farms and the 
size distribution of the Flemish quota.  
 
Figure 2 shows the total number of farms actually observed until 2006 and the simulated 
number of farms until 2014 under the assumption of a free mobility quota regulation and 
restricted mobility quota regulation respectively. 
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Figure 2: number of farms in the period 1995-2014 
 
It is clear that the trend of decreasing number of farms will continue in the nearby future. 
Assuming free mobility, the number of farms will drop from 8,862 farms in 2005 to 6,725 in 
2014. Assuming restricted mobility, the number of farms in 2014 will be 7.5% higher than 
assuming free mobility (7,231). Besides this decreasing total number of farms, the distribution 
of farms over the different states changes as well (Figure 3). The number of smaller farms 
(with a quota less than 200,000 litres) drops the most. Their relative importance decreases 
under both assumptions ‘free mobility’ and ‘restricted mobility’ from more than 55% to 
respectively 39.4 % and 43.2 %. Larger farms (quota more than 400,000 litres) form a larger 
part of the total number of farms. Their share grows from less than 15% to 26.6% and 21.4% 
(resp. free mobility and restricted mobility). 
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Figure 3: Distributions of farms per state for 2005 (actual figures) and simulated in 2014 under 
assumption of free mobility and restricted mobility  
 
This trend is also reflected in the total quota per size category (Figure 4). Small farms are 
loosing importance while larger farms collect a higher share in the total national quota. In 
2005 more than a quarter (25.8%) of the total national (Flemish) quota is in hands of the 
smaller farms. In 2014 these farms only will produce less then 15% when free mobility is 
assumed. When the government imposes a restricted mobility policy, the loss of quota will be 
less and they will produce 18.11%. Looking at the larger farms, they have now a share of 
35.9%. In 2014 the larger farms will produce more than half (51.4%) assuming free mobility 
and 44.0% assuming restricted mobility.  
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Figure 4: Distributions of the total quota per state for 2005 (present figures) and simulated in 2014 under 
assumption of mobility and restricted mobility  
 
The simulated number of farms per size category is the input in the assessment of structural 
development and the influence of quota transfer policy on the rate of change of some key 
sector parameters. The following sub section first describe the production cost and the milk 
quality and then the change of N-excretion.  
 
4.2. Effects of structural change on total production cost and average milk quality  
 
The structural change is given in terms of discrete size distribution of the farms. To evaluate 
the evolution of both sector parameters we first calculate the mean values of these parameters 
for each state (Table 5: average production costs (€/litre milk) and milk quality (penalty-litre-
points/litre quota) given per state). The production cost is the total (variable + fixed) costs per 
litre produced milk over the years 2002-2005. Milk quality is based on data of the period July 
2005 until September 2006. 
 
Table 5: average production costs (€/litre milk) and milk quality (penalty-litre-points/litre quota) given 
per state 
Quota state Production costs (€/litre milk) Milk quality (penalty-litre-points/litre quota) 
1 0.2454 0.190454 
2 0.2003 0.115299 
3 0.1896 0.058469 
4 0.1850 0.045169 
5 0.1809 0.033123 
6 0.1749 0.032476 
 
Larger farms seems to perform better than smaller farms in terms of average production costs 
per litre produced milk (P=0,000), due to the economy of size. Also the milk quality is 
significantly higher on larger farms (P=0.000). As we can find significant differences between 
the states for both parameters it is likely that structural change indeed can also influence the 
aggregate outcome of these sector parameters.  
 
The comparison between the actual quota distribution (2005) and the quota distribution in 
2014 for both policy assumptions is shown in Table 6. Table 7 gives, based on the figures in 
Table 6, the total production costs and the total penalty points per state and for the whole 
sector.  
 
Table 6: Distribution of the national (Flemish) quota (litres quota) in 2005 and 2014 (assuming free 
mobility and assuming restricted mobility)  
State Actual distribution 
(2005) 
Simulated distribution 
in 2014 (free mobility) 
Simulated distribution 
in 2014 (restricted 
mobility) 
1 128,965,098 36,074,387 30,142,701 
2 372,136,287 129,004,614 210,534,250 
3 380,469,262 246,161,811 303,383,914 
4 376,390,172 304,991,336 376,212,338 
5 276,080,514 341,310,113 343,890,009 
6 409,555,211 876,605,624 669,984,670 
 
Table 7: production costs (€) and penalty points (number) given per state in 2005 (present figures) and 
simulated in 2014 under assumption of free mobility (FM) and restricted mobility (RM) 
state Production costs (€)  Penalty-litre-points 
 2005 2014 (FM) 2014 (RM)  2005 2014 (FM) 2014(RM) 
1 31,648,035 15,873,833 15,490,162  24,561,919 12,319,621 12,021,856 
2 74,538,898 42,195,338 57,523,980  42,906,942 24,288,968 33,112,618 
3 72,136,972 59,866,035 66,321,730  22,245,657 18,461,536 20,452,348 
4 69,632,182 64,451,738 71,038,,625  17,001,168 15,736,327 17,344,560 
5 49,942,965 58,380,113 56,865,797  9,144,615 10,689,466 10,412,193 
6 71,631,206 117,523,071 93,693,336  13,300,715 21,822,066 17,397,283 
total  369,530,259 358,290,129 360,933,630  129,161,015 103,317,984 110,740,859 
 
The total costs of producing the Flemish quota has decreased in the recent past and is 
expected to further decline due to the structural development. Under the mobility policy, the 
total production costs will yearly fall on average with 1,248,903 € (-0.338%) during the 
coming 9 years. With a restricted quota mobility, the total production cost falls only with 
955,181 €/year (-0.258%). The average milk quality (expressed by penalty-litre-points) 
benefits from the structural change as well. In 2005 129,161,015 penalty-litre-points were 
given to the whole Flemish sector. In 2014 this number will be very much lower. Assuming 
free mobility 20.00% less penalty points are expected in 2014, while assuming restricted 
mobility we predict only 14.26% reduction in penalty points or in other words a lower 
improvement in quality of about 5.74 %. 
 
4.3.Effects of structural change on sector N-excretion  
 
The total sector N-excretion is based on the total number of cows per size category, which, in 
turn, can be derived from the average productivity per cow for each state. Edwards et al. 
(1985) argue that farm productivity is a function of technological change and structural 
change. This is confirmed by our empirical analysis that shows that the average cow 
productivity during the period 1995-2005 increased (from 5,885 to 6,375 litres). Nevertheless, 
the changes in N-excretion are calculated with a constant productivity because this research 
tries to measure the effect of structural change only.  
Using the average cow productivity in the period 2002-2005 as reference productivity, the 
number of cows per state can be derived by dividing the total quota of farms in that state by 
the average cow productivity in that size category. The N-excretion for each size category can 
be defined by implementing the number of cows and the average cow productivity of that size 
category in the formula (6). Results in Table 8 show that the number of cows will further 
decrease.   
 
Table 8: number of cows and Total N-excretion (kg) given per state in 2005 (actual figures) and simulated 
in 2014 under assumption of free mobility (FM) and restricted mobility (RM) 
state Number of cows (number)  N-excretion (kg) 
 
 Average 
cow 
productivity 
2005 2014 
(FM) 
2014 
(RM) 
 2005 2014 (FM) 2014 (RM) 
1 4,105 33,675 15,758 15,377  2,789,656 1,305,372 1,273,821 
2 5,567 67,681 37,841 51,588  6,398,277 3,577,334 4,876,901 
3 6,459 62,406 48,885 54,157  6,344,963 4,970,250 5,506,220 
4 6,995 53,181 49,805 54,895  5,635,038 5,277,365 5,816,705 
5 7,289 37,015 44,275 43,127  4,009,152 4,795,512 4,671,122 
6 7,573 49,419 88,729 70,738  5,464,938 9,812,003 7,822,458 
total   303,377 285,293 289,881  30,642,024 29,737,836 29,967,227 
 
The current number of cows (303,377) will fall to 289,881 with restricted quota mobility and 
even to 285,293 with free quota mobility. Despite the drop in total number of cows, the 
number of cows in the largest farms (> 500,000 litres) will raise spectacular (free mobility: + 
79.5% and restricted mobility: + 43.1%). This evolution will influence the total N-excretion 
of the Flemish milk sector: under the free mobility assumption in 2014 the total N-output will 
be decreased with 904,188 kg N (-2.95%) and with the restricted mobility assumption the 
total N-output will fall with only 674,797 (-2.20%). 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This article assesses the effects of differences in quota transfer policy on structural change 
and how these structural development changes affect the aggregate sector production costs, 
milk quality and N-excretion in the Flemish dairy sector. The Flemish dairy sector is an 
exemplary case because of the rather drastic change in quota transfer policy in 1996. Between 
1987 and 1996 quota mobility was free while in the period 1996-2004 quota transferability 
was highly restricted. Since 2004 mobility is again liberalized. The presented approach first 
quantifies the rate of structural change with different policy regimes and, secondly, the effect 
of the structural change on the three other sector parameters. The structural change in the 
period 2005-2014 is simulated by means of a discrete second order Markov chain model, 
using aggregate data on the number of farms by size category. This Markov chain model is 
much simpler than other models for structural development in literature because less variables 
are used to explain farm growth. This model is, on the other hand, based on data that describe 
actual quota transactions and can therefore take into account that the quota market is not 
perfect. As a result, it is also possible to compare quota exchanges and structural development 
of different periods in which different quota transaction policies were in place.  
 
It is obvious that in the nearby future many farms will leave the sector. Given the 
transferability of quota and the fixed national quota, the remaining farms will have a higher 
average quota size. Moreover the size distribution of these farms will change as well. Smaller 
farms will have the choice: to grow or to leave the sector. Looking at the past, the majority of 
these farms will sell their quota and leave the sector. A small part of the farms will buy 
additional quota and will shift to a higher size category. The remaining farms will be larger 
and the majority of the farms will have a quota higher than 400,000 l. The production 
continues to concentrate within large size farms. These findings are consistent with the trends 
observed by Weiss (1999) in upper Austria, Zepeda (1995a) and Kim et al. (2005) in the U.S 
and simulated by Colman et al. (2002) for the U.K.  
 
The research also shows that policy measures indeed have an impact on the rate of structural 
change. The results show that structural development is higher during the free market period 
because there appears a demand gap for quota since farms will only sell quota when the quota 
price compensates the foregone profits in the future. Simulation of a continuation of each 
policy until 2014 shows a large difference in the number of farms (7.5% more for restricted 
mobility) and in the change of the size distributions of the Flemish quota (e.g. 14.5% less 
quota for larger farms in case of restricted mobility). 
  
The trend of increasing average quota size and declining number of farms will influence other 
sector parameters as well. Average production costs, milk quality and the total N-excretion of 
the Flemish milk herd will all evolve in a positive manner as a result of structural change, 
ceteris paribus. As we can see in the current sector parameters, larger farms produce milk at 
lower costs while obtaining a better milk quality. Because of the average higher productivity 
of those farms, the total N-excretion will fall as well. Consequently, for the sector 
performance a higher structural change is favourable. Imposing restrictions on the quota 
mobility will lead to a lower rate of structural development and this would also impact the 
evolution of the other sector parameters negatively.  
 
The results have some important policy implications. Two recommendations can be drawn. 
The first lesson is that if quota are implemented and the aim is to have an efficient allocation, 
attention must be paid to the development of a good market structure and market information 
for the farms. Our and other literature results indicate that even in situations with a ‘so-called’ 
free market, a large difference can be found in terms of efficiency indicating that the quota 
market is not functioning well. A second policy advice is that before the quota transaction 
policy is supplemented with social corrections, the impact of these social corrections on other 
policy objectives should be analysed. The objective of the social correction in the quota 
transaction policy in 1996 to enhance the possibility to start new farms has not been reached 
and the results of current study also show that the policy has contributed negatively to the 
reduction of N-excretion objective and led to lower quality of milk. In this case, benefits from 
social objectives could therefore not compensate efficiency losses and the negative impact on 
environmental objectives.  
 
These policy recommendation may be very important for the near future. In 2015, the 
European dairy policy is expected to undergo a significant change which may have important 
implications for the structural development. Therefore some member states, such as The 
Netherlands, ask to anticipate this potential shock with earlier adjustments of the quota policy 
with the possibility of quota transfers among member states. The results presented in this 
paper indicate that significant changes in structural development of such a policy may be 
expected.  
 
The presented modelling approach and results can on the other hand not be used as 
predictions of the future as only the structural change and the impact of it on other elements is 
assessed. Many other elements, such as technology change, fodder prices and world market 
prices influence the analysed parameters production cost, N-excretion and milk quality as 
well. When an attempt is made to make a general descriptive and predictive sector model, 
researcher should, however, keep the effects of structural change in mind, certainly for long-
term simulations or projections.  
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